World's Classics

XLIII THE PRINCE

BY

NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI

THE PRINCE

BY

NICCOL6 MACHIAVELLI

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY

LUIGI RICCI

HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW

NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN

BOMBAY CALCUTTA AND MADRAS

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

Born, Florence „ May 3, 1469

Died, Florence June 22, 1527

The present translation of Machiavelli's * Prince ' was first published in 'The World's Classics' in 1903, and reprinted in 1909 and 1921.

(OCT I 6 ^943

Printed in England by the Garden City Press, Letchworth.

PREFACE

*>

OF all Machiavelli's works The Prince is undoubtedly the greatest ; aiid a new English edition of it is likely to he welcome to all those who have not the advantage of reading it in the classical Italian original.

For a true appreciation of Machiavelli, impossible in a brief Preface, I must refer the English reader to Macaulay's Essay on the Italian historian and statesman. In it he will see how our Author's ideas and work were wrongfully and wilfully misinter- preted by the very men who, while profiting by his wisdom, have with great ingratitude criticised the statesman and defamed his name, as that of the inventor of the worst political system ever imagined. Yet, as his whole life was an indefatigable and un- remitting endeavour to secure for his native Florence a good and popular government, and as he lost his great office of Secretary to the Florentine Republic on account of his avowed liberal opinions, it is not only unjust but ridiculous to accuse him of helping tyrants to enslave the people. What he did was to show in the most deliberate and in the plainest way the arts by which free peoples were made slaves ; and, had his words of advice been always heeded, no tyrant in Italy or elsewhere could have been successful in his policy. That he was not listened to, and his advice scorned and spurned, was not Machiavelli's fault.

vi NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1

Those who still share the opinion of his interested detractors should read his private correspondence with the leaders of liberal ideas in Italy — many of his letters being still left unpublished in the MS. Collection of Giuliano Ricci in the National Library, in the Riccardiana Library (No. 2467), in the Government Archives (Strozzi, Nos. 133 and 1028) of Florence, in the Barberini Library, and in the Collezione Gonnelli of the Palatine Library in Rome.

LUIGT RICCI

22 ALBKMARLE STREET, LONDON, W.

CONTENTS

NICCOLO MACHIAVELL1 TO LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT CHAP. PAGE

1. The various kinds of Government and the

ways by which they are established . 3

2. Of Hereditary Monarchies ... 4

3. Of Mixed Monarchies .... 5

4 Why the Kingdom of Darius, occupied by Alexander, did not rebel against the successors of the latter after his death . 14

5. The way to govern Cities or Dominions

that, previous to being occupied, lived under their own Laws .... 18

6. Of New Dominions which have been ac-

quired by one's own Arms and Powers . 20

7. Of New Dominions acquired by the Power

of others or by Fortune ... 24

8. Of those who have attained the position of

Prince by villainy .... 32

9. Of the Civic Principality . ' .37

10. How the strength of all States should be

measured ...... 41

11. Of Ecclesiastical Principalities . , 44

12. The different kinds of Militia and Mer-

cenary Soldiers 47

vii

viii NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

CHAP. PAGE

13. Of Auxiliary, Mixed, and Native Troops 53

14. AVTiat the duties of a Prince are with

regard to the Militia .... 67

15. Of the things for which Men, and especi-

ally Princes, are praised or blamed . 60

16. Of Liberality and Niggardliness . . 62

17. Of Cruelty and Clemency, and whether it

is better to be loved or feared . . 65

18. In what way Princes must keep faith . 69

19. That we must avoid being despised and

hated 72

20. Whether Fortresses and other things

which Princes often make are useful or injurious 83

21. How a Prince must act in order to gain

reputation 88

22. Of the Secretaries of Princes ... 92

23. How Flatterers must be shunned . . 94

24. Why the Princes of Italy have lost their

States 97

25. How much Fortune can do in human

affairs, and how it may be opposed . 99

26. Exhortation to liberate Italy from the

Barbarians .... 103

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

TO

LORENZO THE MAGNIFICENT

SON OF PIERO DI MEDICI

IT is customary for those who wish to gain the favour of a prince to endeavour to do so by offer- ing him gifts of those things which they hold most precious, or in which they know him to take especial delight. In this way princes are often presented with horses, arms, cloth of gold, gems, and such-like ornaments worthy of their grandeur. In my desire, however, to offer to Your Highness some humble testimony of my devotion, I have been unable to find among my possessions anything which I hold so dear or esteem so highly as that knowledge of the deeds of great men which I have acquired through a long experience of modern events and a constant study of the past.

The results of my long observations and reflec- tions are recorded in the little volume which I now offer to Your Highness : and although I deem this work unworthy of Your Highness's notice, yet my confidence in your humanity assures me that you will accept it, knowing that it is not in my power

2 NICCOI/) MACHIAVELL1

to offer you a greater gift than that of enabling you to understand in the shortest possible time all those things which I have learnt through danger and suffering in the course of many years. I have not sought to adorn my work with long phrases or high-sounding words or any of those allurements and ornaments with which many writers seek to embellish their books, as I desire no honour for my work but such as its truth and the gravity of its subject may justly deserve. Nor will it, I trust, be deemed presumptuous on the part of a man of humble and obscure condition to attempt to discuss and criticise the government of princes ; for in the same way that landscape painters station them- selves in the valleys in order to draw mountains or elevated ground, and ascend an eminence in order to get a good view of the plains, so it is necessary to be a prince to be able to know thoroughly the nature of a people, and to know the nature of princes one must be one of the populace.

May I trust, therefore, that Your Highness will accept this little gift in the spirit in which it is offered ; and if Your Highness will deign to peruse it, you will recognise in it my ardent desire that you may attain to that grandeur which fortune and your own merits presage for you.

And should Your Highness gaze down from the summit of that eminence towards this humble spot, you will recognise the great and unmerited suffer- ings inflicted on me by a cruel fate.

THE PRINCE

CHAPTER I

THE VARIOUS KINDS OP GOVERNMENT AND THE WAYS BY WHIC1I THEY ARE ESTABLISHED

ALL states and dominions which hold or have held sway over mankind are either republics or monarchies. Monarchies are either hereditary ones, in which the rulers have been for many years of the same family, or else they are those of recent foundation. The newly founded ones are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or else they are, as it were, new members grafted on to the hereditary possessions of the prince that annexes them, as is the kingdom of Naples to the King of Spain. The dominions thus acquired have either been previously accustomed to the rule of another prince, or else have been free states, and they are annexed either by force of arms of the prince, or of others, or else fall to him by good fortune or merit.

CHAPTER II

OF HEREDITARY MONARCHIES

I WILL not here speak of republics, having already treated of them fully in another place. I will deal only with monarchies, and will show how the various kinds described above can be governed and maintained. In the first place, in hereditary states accustomed to the reigning family the difficulty of maintaining them is far less than in new monarchies ; for it is sufficient not to exceed the ancestral usages, and to accommodate one's self to accidental circum- stances ; in this way such a prince, if of ordinary ability, will always be able to maintain his position, unless some very exceptional and excessive force deprives him of it ; and even if he be thus deprived of it, on the slightest misfortune happening to the new occupier, he will be able to regain it.

We have in Italy the example of the Duke of Ferrara, who was able to withstand the assaults of the Venetians in the year '84, and of Pope Julius in the year '10, for no other reason than because of the antiquity of his family in that dominion. In as much as the legitimate prince has less cause and less necessity to give offence, it is only natural that he should be more loved ; and, if no extraordi- nary vices make him hated, it is only reasonable for his subjects to be naturally attached to him, the memories and causes of innovations being forgotten in the long period over which his rule has existed ; whereas one change always leaves the way prepared for the introduction of another.

CHAPTER III

OF MIXED MONARCHIES

Bur it is in the new monarchy that difficulties really exist. Firstly, if it is not entirely new, but a member as it were of a mixed state, its disorders spring at first from a natural difficulty which exists in all new dominions, because men change masters willingly, hoping to better themselves ; and this belief makes them take arms against their rulers, in which they are deceived, as experience shows them that they have gone from bad to worse. This is the result of another very natural cause, which is the necessary harm inflicted on those over whom the prince obtains dominion, both by his soldiers and by an infinite number of other injuries unavoidably caused by his occupation.

Thus you find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying that dominion, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have helped you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfil their expectations, nor can you use strong measures with them, being under an obliga- tion to them ; for which reason, however strong your armies may be, you will always need the favour of the inhabitants to take possession of a province. It was from these causes that Louis XII. of France, though able to occupy Milan without trouble, immediately lost it, and the forces of

6 NICCOL6 MACHIAVELL1

Ludovico alone were sufficient to take it from him the first time, for the inhabitants who had willingly- opened their gates to him, finding themselves deluded in the hopes they had cherished and not obtaining those benefits that they had anticipated, could not bear the vexatious rule of their new prince. It is indeed true that, after reconquering the rebel territories they are not so easily lost again, for the ruler is now, by the fact of the rebellion, less averse to secure his position by punishing offenders, investigating any suspicious circumstances, and strengthening himself in weak places. So that although the mere appearance of such a person as Duke Ludovico on the frontier was sufficient to cause France to lose Milan the first time, to make her lose her grip of it the second time was only possible when all the world was against her, and after her enemies had been defeated and driven out of Italy ; which was the result of the causes above mentioned. Nevertheless it was taken from her both the first and the second time. The general causes of the first loss have been already discussed ; it remains now to be seen what were the causes of the second loss and by what means France could have avoided it, or what measures might have been taken by another ruler in that position which were not taken by the King of France. Be it observed, therefore, that those states which on annexation are united to a previously existing state may or may not be of the same nationality and language. If they are, it is very easy to hold them, especially if they are not accustomed to freedom ; and to possess them securely it suffices that the family of the princes which formerly governed them be extinct. For the rest, their old condition not being disturbed, and there being no dissimilarity of customs, the people settle down quietly under their new rulers, as is seen in the case of Burgundy, Brittany, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been so long

THE PRINCE 7

united to France ; and although there may be some slight differences of language, the customs of the people are nevertheless similar, and they can get along well together, and whoever obtains possession of them and wishes to retain them must bear in mind two things : the one, that the blood of their old rulers is extinct ; the other, to make no altera- tion either in their laws or in their taxes ; in this way they will in a very short space of time become united with their old possessions and form one state. But when dominions are acquired in a province differing in language, laws, and customs, the difficulties to be overcome are great, and it requires good fortune as well as great industry to retain them ; one of the best and most certain means of doing so would be for the new ruler to take up his residence in them. This would render their possession more secure and durable, it is what the Turk has done in Greece ; in spite of all the other measures taken by him to hold that state, it would not have been possible to retain it had he not gone to live there. Being on the spot, dis- orders can be seen as they arise and can quickly be remedied, but living at a distance, they are only heard of when they get beyond remedy. Besides which, the province is not despoiled by your officials, the subjects are pleased with the easy accessibility of their prince ; and wishing to be loyal they have more reason to love him, and should they be other- wise they will have greater cause to fear him.

Any external Power who wishes to assail that state will be less disposed to do so ; so that as long as he resides there he will be very hard to dis- possess. The other and better remedy is to plant colonies in one or two of those places which form as it were the keys of the land, for it is necessary either to do this or to maintain a large force of armed men. The colonies will cost the prince little ; with little or no expense on his part, he

8 NICCOLt) MACH1AVELL1

can send and maintain them ; he only injures those whose lands and houses are taken to give to the new inhabitants, and these form but a small proportion of the state, and those who are injured, remaining poor and scattered, can never do any harm to him, and all the others are, on the one hand, not injured and therefore easily pacified ; and, on the other, are fearful of offending lest they should be treated like those who have been dispossessed of their property. To conclude, these colonies cost nothing, are more faithful, and give less offence ; and the injured parties being poor and scattered are unable to do mischief, as I have shown. For it must be noted, that men must either be caressed or else annihilated ; they will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones ; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance. But by maintaining a garrison instead of colonists, one will spend much more, and consume in guarding it all the revenues of that state, so that the acquisition will result in a loss, besides giving much greater offence, since it injures every one in that state with the quartering of the army on it ; which being an inconvenience felt by all, every one becomes an enemy, and these are enemies which can do mischief, as, though beaten, they remain in their own homes. In every way, therefore, a garrison is as useless as colonies are useful. Further, the ruler of a foreign province as described, should make himself the leader and defender of his less powerful neighbours, and endeavour to weaken the stronger ones, and take care that his possessions are not entered by some foreigner not less powerful than himself, who will always intervene at the request of those who are discontented either through ambition or fear, as was seen when the ^Etoli invited the Romans into Greece ; and in whatever province they entered, it was always at the request of the inhabitants. And

THE PRINCE 9

the rule is that when a powerful foreigner enters a province, all the less powerful inhabitants become his adherents, jnoved by the envy they bear to those ruling over them ; so much so that with regard to these minor potentates he has no trouble whatever in winning them over, for they willingly join forces with the state that he has acquired. He has merely to be careful that they do not assume too much power and authority, and he can easily with his own forces and their favour put down those that are powerful and remain in every- thing the arbiter of that province. And he who does not govern well in this way will soon lose what he has acquired, and while he holds it will meet with infinite difficulty and trouble.

The Romans in the provinces they took, always followed this policy ; they established colonies, flattered the less powerful without increasing their strength, put down the most powerful and did not allow foreign rulers to obtain influence in them. I will let the single province of Greece suffice as an example. They made friends with the Achaei and the ^Etoli, the kingdom of Macedonia was cast down, and Antiochus driven out, nor did they allow the merits of the Achaei or the ^Etoli to gain them any increase of territory, nor did the persuasions of Philip induce them to befriend him without lowering him, nor could the power of Antiochus make them consent to allow him to hold any state in that province.

For the Romans did in this case what all wise princes should do, who look not only at present dangers but also at future ones and diligently guard against them ; for being foreseen they can easily be remedied, but if one waits till they are at hand, the medicine is no longer in time as the malady has become incurable ; it happening with this as with those hectic fevers spoken of by doctors, which at their beginning are easy to cure but difficult to-

10 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

recognise, but in course of time when they have not at first been recognised and treated, become easy to recognise and difficult to cure. Thus it happens in matters of state ; for knowing afar off (which it is only given to a prudent man to do) the evils that are brewing, they are easily cured. But when, for want of such knowledge, they are allowed to grow so that every one can recognise them, there is no longer any remedy to be found. However, the Romans, observing these disorders while yet remote, were always able to find a remedy, and never allowed them to proceed in order to avoid a war ; for they knew that war was not to be avoided, and could be deferred only to the advantage of the other side; they therefore declared war against Philip and Antiochus in Greece, so as not to have to fight them in Italy, though they might at the time have avoided either ; this they did not choose to do, never caring to do that which is now every day to be heard in the mouths of our wise men, to enjoy the benefits of time, but preferring those of their own virtue and prudence, for time brings with it all things, and may produce indifferently either good or evil. But let us return to France and examine whether she did any of these things ; and I will speak not of Charles, but of Louis as the one whose proceedings can be better seen, as he held posses- sion in Italy for a longer time ; you will then see that he did the opposite of all those things which must be done to keep possession of a foreign state. King Louis was called into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who wished by his coming to gam half of Lombardy. I will not blame the king for coming nor for the part he took, because wishing to plant his foot in Italy, and not having friends in the country, on the contrary the conduct of King Charles having caused all doors to be closed to him, he was forced to accept what friendships he could find, and his schemes would have quickly been

THE PRINCE 11

successful if he had made no mistakes m his other proceedings.

The king then having acquired Lombardy re- gained immediately the reputation lost by Charles. Genoa yielded, the Florentines became his friends, the Marquis of Mantua, the Dukes of Ferrara and Bentivogli, the Lady of Furli, the Lords of Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, and Piombino, the inhabitants of Lucca, of Pisa, and of Sienna, all approached him with offers of friendship. The Venetians might then have seen the effects of their temerity, how to gain a few lands in Lombardy they had made the king ruler over two-thirds of Italy. Consider how little difficulty the king would have had in maintaining his reputation in Italy if he had observed the rules above given, and kept a firm and sure hold over all those friends of his, who being many in number, and weak, and fearful one of the Church, another of the Venetians, were always obliged to hold fast to him, and by whose aid he could easily make sure of any who were still great. But he was hardly in Milan before he did exactly the opposite, by giving aid to Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. Nor did he perceive that, in taking this course, he weakened himself, by casting off his friends and those who had placed themselves at his disposal, and strengthened the Church by adding to the spiritual power, which gives it such authority, further temporal powers. And having made the first mistake, he was obliged to follow it up, whilst, to put a stop to the ambition of Alexander and pre- vent him becoming ruler of Tuscany, he was forced to come to Italy. And not content with having increased the power of the Church and lost his friends, he now desiring the kingdom of Naples, divided it with the king of Spain ; and where he alone was the arbiter of Italy, he now brought in a companion, so that the ambitious of that province

12 NICCOLO MACH1AVELLI

who were dissatisfied with him might have some one else to appeal to ; and where he might have left in that kingdom a king tributary to him, he dis- possessed him in order to bring in another who was capable of driving him out. The desire to acquire possessions is a very natural and ordinary thing, and when those men do it who can do so successfully, they are always praised and not blamed, but when they cannot and yet want to do so at all costs, they make a mistake deserving of great blame. If France, therefore, with her own forces could have taken Naples, she ought to have done so ; if she could not she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition of Lombardy with the Venetians is to be excused, as having been the means of allow- ing the French king to set foot in Italy, this other partition deserves blame, not having the excuse of necessity. Louis had thus made these five mistakes : he had crushed the smaller Powers, increased the power in Italy of one ruler, brought into the land a very powerful foreigner, and he had not come to live there himself, nor had he established any colonies. Still these mistakes might, if he had lived, not have injured him, had he not made the sixth, that of taking the state from the Venetians ; for, if he had not strengthened the Church and brought the Spaniards into Italy, it would have been right and necessary to humble them ; having once taken those measures, he ought never to have consented to their ruin ; because, had the Venetians been strong, it would have kept the others from making attempts on Lombardy, partly because the Venetians would not have consented to any measures by which they did not get it for themselves, and partly because the others would not have wanted to take it from France to give it to Venice, and would not have had the courage to attack both.

If any one urges that King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain

THE PRINCE 13

in order to avoid war, I reply, with the reasons already given, that one ought never to allow a dis- order to take place in order to avoid war, for war is not thereby avoided, but only deferred to your dis- advantage. And if others allege the promise given by the king to the pope to undertake that enter- prise for him, in return for the dissolution of his marriage and for the cardinalship of Rohan, I reply with what I shall say later on about the faith of princes and how it is to be observed. Thus King Louis lost Lombardy through not observing any of those conditions which have been observed by others who have taken provinces and wished to retain them. Nor is this any miracle, but very reasonable and natural. I spoke of this matter with Cardinal Rohan at Nantes when Valentine, as Cesare Borgia, son of Pope Alexander, was commonly called, was occupying the Romagna, for on Cardinal Rohan saying to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied that the French did not understand politics, for if they did they would never allow the Church to become so great. And experience shows us that the greatness in Italy of the Church and also of Spain have been caused by France, and her ruin has proceeded from them. From which may be drawn a general rule, which never or very rarely fails, that whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful, is ruined himself ; for that power is pro- duced by him either through craft or force ; and both of these are suspected jby the one that has become powerful.

CHAPTER IV

THE KINGDOM OP DARIUS, OCCUPIED BY ALEX- ANDER, DID NOT REBEL AGAINST THE SUCCESSORS OF THE LATTER AFTER HIS DEATH.

CONSIDERING the difficulties there are in holding a newly acquired state, some may wonder how it came to pass that Alexander the Great became master of Asia in a few years, and had hardly occupied it when he died, from which it might be supposed that the whole state would have rebelled. However, his successors maintained themselves in possession, and had no further difficulty in doing so than those which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

I reply that the kingdoms known to history have been governed in two ways : either by a prince and his servants, who, as ministers by his grace and permission, assist in governing the realm ; or by a prince and by barons, who hold their positions not by favour of the ruler but by antiquity of blood. Such barons have states and subjects of their own, who recognise them as their lords, and are naturally attached to them. In those states which are governed by a prince and his servants, the prince possesses more authority, because there is no one in the state regarded as a superior besides himself, and if others are obeyed it is merely as ministers and officials of the prince, and no one regards them with any 14

THE PRINCE 15

special affection. Examples of these two kinds of government in our own time are the Turk and the King of France. All the Turkish monarchy is governed by one ruler, the others are his servants, and dividing his kingdom into " sangiacates/' he sends to them various administrators, and changes or recalls them at his pleasure. But the King of France is surrounded by a large number of ancient nobles, recognised as such by their subjects, and loved by them ; they have their prerogatives, which the king cannot deprive them of without danger to himself. Whoever now considers these two states will see that it would be difficult to acquire the state of the Turk; but having conquered it, it would be very easy to hold it.

The causes of the difficulty of occupying the Turkish kingdom are, that the invader could not be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope to facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those around him, as will be evident from reasons given above. Because, being all slaves, and bound, it will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if they were corrupted, little effect could be hoped for, as they would not be able to carry the people with them for the reasons mentioned. Therefore, whoever assaults the Turk must be prepared to meet his united forces, and must rely more on his own strength than on the disorders of others ; but having once conquered him, and beaten him in battle so that he can no longer raise armies, nothing else is to be feared except the family of the prince, and if this is extinguished, there is no longer any one to be feared, the others having no credit with the people ; and as the victor before the victory could place no hope in them, so he need not fear them afterwards. The contrary is the case in kingdoms governed like that of France, because it is easy to enter them by winning over some baron of the kingdom, there being always some malcontents,

16 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

and those desiring innovations. These can, for the reasons stated, open the way to you and facilitate victory ; but afterwards, if you wish to keep posses- sion, infinite difficulties arise, both from those who have aided you and from those you have oppressed. Nor is it sufficient to extinguish the family of the prince, for there remain those nobles who will make themselves the head of new changes, and being neither able to content them nor exterminate them, you will Jose the state whenever an occasion arises. Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius you will fma it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and tnere- fore Alexander had first to completely overthrow it and seize the country, after which victory, Darius being dead, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the reasons discussed above. And his successors, had they remained united, might have enjoyed it in peace, nor did any tumults arise in the kingdom except those fomented by themselves. But it is impossible to possess with such ease countries con- stituted like France.

Hence arose the frequent rebellions of Spain, France, and Greece against the Romans, owing to the numerous principalities which existed in those states ; for, as long as the memory of these lasted, the Romans were always uncertain of their pos- sessions ; but when the memory of these princi- palities had been extinguished they became, with the power and duration of the empire, secure pos- sessions.

And afterwards the latter could, when fighting among themselves, draw each one with him a portion of these provinces, according to the authority he had established there, and these provinces, when the family of their ancient princes was extinct, recognised no other rulers but the Romans. Con- sidering these things, therefore, let no one be sur- prised at the facility with which Alexander could hold

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Asia, and at the difficulties that others have had in holding acquired possessions, like Pyrrhus and many others ; as this was not caused hy the greater or smaller ability of the conqueror, but depended on the dissimilarity of the conditions.

CHAPTER V

THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OB DOMINIONS THAT, PREVIOUS TO BEING OCCUPIED, LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS.

WHEN those states which have heen acquired are accustomed to live at liberty under their own laws, there are three ways of holding them. The first is to ruin them ; the second is to go and live there in person ; the third is to allow them to live under their own laws, taking tribute of them, and creating there within the country a state composed of a few who will keep it friendly to you. Because this state, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot exist without his friendship and protection, and will do all it can to keep them, and a city used to liberty can be more easily held by means of its citizens than in any other way, if you wish to preserve it. There is the example of the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes by creating within them a state of a few people ; nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, destroyed them, but did not lose them. They wanted to hold Greece in almost the same way as the Spartans held it, leaving it free and under its own laws, but they did not succeed ; so that they were compelled to destroy many cities in that province in order to keep it, because in truth there 18

THE PRINCE 19

is no sure method of holding them except by ruin- ing them. And whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be destroyed by it, for it can always find a motive for rebellion in the name of liberty and of its ancient usages, which are forgotten neither by lapse of time nor by benefits received, and whatever one does or provides, so long as the inhabitants are not separated or dispersed, they do not forget that name and those usages, but appeal to them at once in every emergency, as did Pisa after being so many years held in servitude by the Florentines. But when cities or provinces have been accustomed to live under a prince, and the family of that prince is extinguished, being on the one hand used to obey, ami on the other not having their old prince, they cannot unite in choosing one from among themselves, and they do not know how to live in freedom, so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over with greater facility and establish himself securely. But in republics there is greater life, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance ; they do not and cannot cast aside the memory of their ancient liberty, so that the surest way is either to destroy them or reside in them.

CHAPTER VI

OF NEW DOMINIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND POWERS

LET no one marvel if in speaking of new dominions both as to prince and state, I bring- forward very exalted instances, for as men walk almost always in the paths trodden by others, proceeding in their actions by imitation, and not being always able to follow others exactly, nor attain to the excellence of those they imitate, a prudent man should always follow in the path trodden by great men and imitate those who are most excellent, so that if he does not attain to their greatness, at any rate he will get some tinge of it. He will do like prudent archers, who when the place they wish to hit is too far off, knowing how far their bow will carry, aim at a spot much higher than the one they wish to hit, not in order to reach this height with their arrow, but by help of this high aim to hit the spot they wish to. I say then that in new dominions, where there is a new prince, it is more or less easy to hold them according to the greater or lesser ability of him who acquires them. And as the fact of a private individual becoming a prince presupposes either great ability or good fortune, it would appear that either of these things would mitigate in part many difficulties. Nevertheless those who have been wanting as regards good fortune have maintained 20

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themselves best. The matter is also facilitated by the prince being obliged to reside personally in his territory, having no others. But to come to those who have become princes through their own merits and not by fortune, I regard as the greatest,

Cyrus. Romulus, Tbqseus. and such like. And although one should not speak of Moses, he having merely carried out what was ordered him by God, still he deserves admiration, if only for that grace which made him worthy to speak with God. Cut regarding Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, they will all be found worthy of admiration ; and if their particular actions and methods are examined they will not appear very different from those of Moses, although he had so great a Master. And in examining their life and deeds it will be seen that they owed nothing to fortune but the opportunity which gave them matter to be shaped into the form that they thought fit ; and without that opportunity their powers would have been wasted, and without their powers the opportunity would have come in vain. It was thus necessary that Moses should find the people of Israel slaves in Egypt and oppressed by the Egyptians, so that they were disposed to follow him in order to escape from their servitude. It was necessary that Romulus should be unable to remain in Alba, and should have been exposed at his birth, in order that he might become King of Rome and founder of that nation. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the empire of the Medes, and the Medes weak and effeminate through long peace. Theseus could not have showed his abilities if he had not found the Athenians dispersed.

These opportunities, therefore, gave these men their chance, and their own great qualities enabled them to profit by them, so as to ennoble their country and augment its fortunes. Those who by

22 NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI

heroic means such as these hecome princes, ohtain their dominions with difficulty but retain them easily, and the difficulties which they have in ac- quiring their dominions arise in part from the new rules and regulations that they have to introduce in order to establish their position securely. It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new order, this lukewarmness arising partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in their favour ; and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it. Thus it arises that on every opportunity for attack- ing the reformer, his opponents do so with the zeal of partisans, the others only defend him half- heartedly, so that between them he runs great danger. ' It is necessary, however, in order to investigate thoroughly this question, to examine whether these innovators are independent, or whether they depend upon others, that is to say, whether in order to carry out their designs they have to entreat or are able to force. In the first case they invariably succeed ill, and accomplish nothing ; but when they can depend on their own strength and are able to use force, they rarely fail. Thus it comes about that all armed prophets have conquered and unarmed ones failed ; for besides what has been already said, the character of people varies, and it is easy to persuade them of a thing, but difficult to keep them in that persuasion. And so it is necessary to order things so that when they no longer believe, they can be made to believe by force. Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus would not have been able to make their institutions

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observed for so long had they been disarmed, as happened in our own time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who failed entirely in his new rules when the multitude began to disbelieve in him, and he had no means of holding fast those who had believed nor of compelling the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such men as these have great difficulty in making their way, and all their dangers are met on the road and must be overcome by their own abilities ; but when once they have overcome them and have begun to be held in veneration, and have suppressed those who envied them, they remain powerful and secure, honoured and happy. To the high examples given I will add a lesser one, which, however, is to be compared in some