Vol. Ne. |) + » + A REVIEW PUBLICATIONS January, 1918 Psychological Bulletin


SHEPHERD I. FRANZ, Govr. Hosp. ror INSANE HOWARD C. WARREN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY (Review) JOHN B. WATSON, Jouns Hopkins University (/, of Exp. Psych.) JAMES R. ANGELL, UNiversity or CuicaGo ( Monographs) ann MADISON BENTLEY, UNIVERsITY oF ILLINoIs (/ndex)



CONTENTS General Reviews and Summaries : Historical Contributions: W. Ritey, 1. General Standpoints: Mind and Body: W. T. Marvin, 4. Comsctousness and the Unconscious: A. P. Weiss, 9. Dreams: E. P. Frost, 12. Terminology: H. C. Warren, 15. Text-Books and General Treatises: H. S. LANGFELD, 16.

Notes and News, 24.



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Vol. 15, No. 1. January, 1918





Vassar College

In the quarter centenary of the founding of the American Psy- chological Association the year 1917 is signalized by a variety of valuable retrospects. Jastrow (4) vividly portrays pioneer days in the development of our psychology, Johns Hopkins University being its rallying point, George T. Ladd’s text book its first monumental work, and William James the genius who guided its early destinies. Here there have been five overlapping waves: (1) the direct analytical interest of the man of the labratory; (2) the comparative interest which hasyielded its interpretative product in the behaviorist position; (3) the growth of applied psychology from advertising to education, with an overgrowth which threatens to make our people efficient though incompetent; (4) concern with the abnormal, from the early “ghost hunting” of psychical research to the present Freudian psy- choanalysis; (5) social psychology where the laboratory with its simplified and scheduled analyses finds its corrective in the intricate worldly composite of conflicting forces. G. Stanley Hall (3) recalls the opposition—twenty five years ago—to German philosophy as pan- theistic, to experimental psychology as materialistic as instanced by the criticism of President McCosh of Princeton of Hall’s laboratory at Hopkins. An interesting account is given of the early struggles of the American Journal of Psychology, and of the first membership of the American Psychological Association. Pillsbury (5) contrasts the state of the different branches of psychology in 1892 with the present. Then, educational problems were still treated in an a priori way;



psychiatry was influenced by Kraepelin, but the experimental study of the mental processes of the insane was hardly begun; animal psy- chology was largely a collection of anecdotes. Now, education is illuminated by the study of the child under the questionnaire method of and Hall, the statistical methods of Pearson; psychiatry by such estab- lishments as the McLean Hospital, and by the clinical study of hys- teria, to some degree by the Freudian psychoanalysis, and especially by the Binet and Simon tests of intelligence, which sociologically has correlated crime and poverty with mental incapacity. Finally animal psychology, beginning with Thorndike’s method of trial and error has eventuated in the contributions of the behaviorists. Cowles (1) describes the general position of psychiatry in America in its theory and practice (1880-1890). (1) Alienists were then subject, by general consent, to the claims of pathological anatomy as the master science in general pathology. ‘Twenty years later it was concluded that this was of more academic than practical interest to the psychiatrist. (2) Mental physiology was then a desideratum for true explaining principles and the alienists avoided the speculations of academic psychology which gave little aid. (3) The physical conditions asso- ciated with mental diseases, led to systems of classification based upon the etiology of mental disorders as sequences of general diseases. (4) Most significant was the adoption of the “supporting treatment,” as a basis of the neurasthenic concept developed in the science of neurology. ‘This led to the establishment of such a laboratory of bio-chemistry as that at McLean Hospital. This combination of psychology and chemistry with pathology is traced through various institutions to the present time.

As a summary of the last quarter century Washburn (8) points out how far psychology has enlarged its field of observation. The advance into new regions is suggested by a comparative study of the first volume of The Psychological Index, and the last volume. Un- known to the first volume were such headings as these: social psychol- ogy, educational psychology, psychoanalysis, psychology of values, psychology of testimony, religion and myths, advertising. Besides enlarging its field psychology has improved its methods of observa- tion, such as the formulas for calculating correlation, the technique of studies on the sensory discrimination of animals and the increased emphasis upon introspection as a supplement to objective methods.

As a complement to the above, Franz (2) investigates the scientific productivity of American professional psychologists. This has been better dealt with in an impersonal way. Cattell’s scheme was an


attempt to grade psychologists by the votes of a few selected indi- viduals. Advances have been made by our psychologists, but by whom have the advances been made, and in what manner have individuals or groups contributed to that advance? For the decade 1906-1915 Franz offers such tables as these: (1) the kinds of published contributions; (2) the grouping of published contributions according to the yearly number of publications; (3) the numbers of expected contributors, or actual contributors, or those contributing articles and monographs; (4) the distribution of psychologists; (§) comparison of totals of contributions by the older and younger groups. Based on the Psychological Index some results are these: (1) the notable decrease in 1914 is unexplained, the European war not affecting American psychologists; (2) and (3) the average of contributions of the older men was double that of the younger; but from (4) and (5) this is discounted by the fact that the older group has the advantage of professional and mechanical assistance, and less labor in teaching.

As to the correlations between psychology and philosophy Sabine (6)claims that between 1850 and 1890 metaphysics was at a low ebb because of the lack of codrdination with the sciences. But in the last twenty-five years there have been established relationships be- tween biology and psychology, and psychology and philosophy superseding the deadening influence of Neo-Hegelianism, so prevalent in England and America. The artificial and unwholesome disorganiza- tion between psychology and philosophy under which parallelism flourished has been preceded by an effort to show the part played by mental operations in the total functioning of the organism. Similarly Tufts (7) maintains that in the last quarter century ethics has passed from the old categories, from Sidgwick to Paulsen, into a genetic study of morality. This has the advantage both of the wealth of new ma- terial offered by anthropology and of the methods of interpretation suggested by social psychology. From the standpoint of evolution ethics has ranged from the ultra-Darwinism of Nietzsche, to the recent views on value, where there is an increasing element of controlling the situation, and not simply of adaptation to it.


1. Cowes, E. Research in pathological psychology and bio-chemistry. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 28, 117-140.

2. Franz,S. I. The scientific productivity of American professional psychologists. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 197-219.

3. Hatt,G.S. Areminiscence. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 28, 297-300.

4. Jastrow, J. Varieties of psychological experience. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 249- 265.


5. Pittspury, W. B. The new development in psychology in the past quarter cen- tury. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 56-69.

6. Sapine, G. H. Philosophical and scientific specialization. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 16-27.

. Turts, J. H. Ethics in the last twenty-five years. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 28-45.

. Wasusurn, M. F. Some thoughts on the last quarter century in psychology. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 46-55.



BY WALTER T. MARVIN Rutgers College

During the past year behaviorism has continued to be a prominent subject of discussion. Watson (17) has attempted to formulate the scope of behavior psychology in an article whose material is to be used in the introductory chapter of his forthcoming book, Human Psy- chology. He describes the procedure of common sense, the pro- cedure of science in interpreting behavior, and the divisions of be- havior psychology and its relation to other sciences. In two articles Weiss (19, 20) points out the relations respectively between struc- tural and behavior psychology and between functional and behavior psychology. First, without attempting to ascertain whether or not behaviorism is psychology, he endeavors to show that “the problems of the structural psychologist may be studied from the behavioristic point of view in accordance with the methods employed in the natural sciences and with a greater degree of simplicity than is possible from the structuralistic point of view.” Since science recognizes only conscious states that express themselves in behavior of some form, this behavior alone calls for analysis. Again, since introspection is behavior (speech) and since introspection usually reveals only reac- tions to obscure stimuli, it is better to direct our study at once to behavior and especially to the major reactions, for these are the im- portant objects to be investigated. Finally, behaviorism can analyze as far as structuralism, can present its phenomena as a causal series, and, if it succeeds in solving its problems, can solve all the problems of the structuralist also. Second, “the functionalists have never shown how mental activity may control action.” On the contrary, the evidence shows that “conscious processes” follow and do not cause the conditions that modify behavior. Moreover, here as in structural psychology, verbal reactions have little if any influence upon the socially significant reactions.


In contrast with the foregoing Yerkes (21) finds Watson’s dog- matic assertion of the adequacy of behaviorism and his refusal to admit the possible value of other presuppositions and methods “an ‘illiberal attachment’ to an assemblage of ideas which is in itself valuable, but which certainly does not monopolize the profitable possibilities of psychology or physiology.”

Related to Watson’s behaviorism is his hope (16) that “‘the men behind the psychoanalytic movement will come to realize that they have not buiit up a complete psychology differing toto caelo from anything which has existed before. When clearer discussion is pos- sible we venture to predict that the one thing which will stand out as distinctly Freudian will be their utilization of the principle of Ueber- tragung.” ‘That is to say, by the method of conditioned reflexes emotional reactions can be bonded with new situations and these emotional reactions furnish the ‘drive’ absent in ordinary behavior. To an earlier and similar criticism of the Freudian psychology made by Watson, Jelliffe (11) replies that the behaviorist misunderstands the terminology of the Freudian and the place it occupies in practical psychology. The Freudian is not using the effete terms of psychology, rather he has taken many of those which had grown meaningless and sterile and has put new meaning and life into them. At this point two criticisms of Holt’s book, The Freudian Wish, may conveniently be referred to. Neither author finds Holt a genuine Freudian. According to Watson (18) he is a behaviorist, but not a thoroughly consistent one. According to Calkins (3) he makes the self psy- chologically fundamental without having intended to do so.

Finally, three other articles should be mentioned here because of their explicit or implicit criticism of extreme behaviorism. Pillsbury (12) in discussing the new developments in psychology during the past twenty-five years refers to three types of psychological explana- tion at present apparent, at one extreme animism and at the other behaviorism and between these extremes the explanation of mental states in terms of other mental states. This last is adopted by the majority of psychologists. His own view is that “the choice of one rather than another of these general principles of explanation seems so little related either to the known facts or to the earlier experience of the psychologist that it can hardly be regarded as other than arbitrary.” Against the attack of behaviorism upon introspection as a method of psychological research Washburn (15) raises three points. First, it is not because introspection has produced no results of scientific value that it is attacked by the behaviorist but because


he is not interested in states of consciousness and therefore thinks an account of them worthless. Second, introspection has been of ex- treme importance as a supplement to objective methods, for example, in the study of the learning process and even in abnormal psychology. Third, where, as in the study of the higher thought processes, no objective methods are available, the unsatisfactory condition of affairs is our own fault. ‘“‘Why should we not recognize that con- flicting descriptions of the same experience, on the part of trained introspectors, are each of equal value and authority, and simply mean that the experience in question really differs in different minds?” Carr (5) proposes the view that “the mental functions with which psychology concerns itself are in reality psychophysical, and at times neural, activities and that psychology shall study and attempt to comprehend these functions in their entirety.” This view offers a way to mediate between the extremes of subjectivism and behavior- ism; it changes our attitude toward the purposes and methods of comparative psychology; and it removes the serious difficulties of subjectivism.

At the December 1916 meeting of the American Philosophical Association the nature of the mental as contrasted with the physical was an assigned subject for papers and discussion. Fite (g) puts the question, Where in the world is consciousness? He replies, Where in the world is it not? It is not in the mind but in the world and everywhere in the world. It is the “familiarity” and “intelligi- bility” of things as opposed to their “strangeness” and “opacity.” “Tn the familiarity and intelligibility of things we find our conscious- ness and ourselves; in their strangeness and opacity, the limitations of our consciousness and of ourselves.” Again, “in the familiarity and intelligibility of things I find myself; but I am myself no less substantive an entity, and no less of an immediate and original fact or phenomenon, than the things with which I am familiar.” Bode (1) maintains that the problem of consciousness must be attacked through a consideration of the facts of behavior. But not all be- havior is conscious behavior, and therefore in differentiating con- scious from other behavior we find the nature of the mental or psy- chical. “All consciousness is behavior directed or controlled by the environment with reference to a future result or a future adaptation.” It is not specific response as such (Holt) but is an organized system of discharge. And this organization is not an inborn mechanism as is reflex action, but is experimental, flexible, and selective, and must be provided for continuously. Cohen (8) finds in a neutral monism


(or it may be equally well called a neutral pluralism) the basis for distinguishing the mental and the physical. “Every system, physical or mental, is but a class or selection of neutral entities, and therefore can be defined only by the character of the fundamental principles or postulates of the system.” The physical is the class of entities to which physical laws are applicable and the mental the class of entities to which in turn psychological laws are applicable. And the two classes are not mutually exclusive. Pratt (13) defends a dualistic view. “Consciousness and the world of physical objects in space are essentially different from each other in kind.” The psychical though spatial is not in space and exists only as functions of organ- isms. Some of the principal reasons for this dualism are: the sub- jectivity of emotions, meanings, images, and so forth; the privacy of the mental content; the innumerable different images derivable from one physical object by different observers and by the same observer at different times; and the physical and physiological facts of per- ception. Hoernlé (10) maintains, on the one hand, “if we want definitions of the mental and the physical as distinguishable entities in our universe, we should go to the sciences which need and offer such definitions, and not to philosophy”; and, he maintains, on the other hand, philosophy should point out that the objects of science are ideal constructions, abstractions, or selections. ‘The mental and the physical do not exhaust between them the whole universe. Finally, if we “restore both terms to their context in concrete expe- rience, we perceive that their relation is not one of mutual exclusion, but rather that mind is a distinctive form of activity exhibited by bodies of a certain structure.” Urban (14) deals with a related problem, the knowledge of other minds. ‘To know one’s own mind is to know one’s purposes, intentions, and meanings; and to know another’s mind is to share his meanings, intentions, and values.

The general standpoints presupposed in self-psychology have been further discussed by Calkins (2, 4). First, self-psychology is to be distinguished from vitalism. ‘The two doctrines oppose in common a mechanistic conception of psychology, but there the agree- ment ends. “For the heart of vitalism is its metaphysical concep- tion of a soul which guides the organism in its growth and functioning, whereas self-psychology deals with the experienced self to which it attributes neither freedom, nor a peculiar potency, nor guiding force.”” Second, why do not all psychologists acknowledge the exis- tence of the self? There is an historical reason. The self has been confused with the soul, and modern thought has wrongly discarded


the former with the latter. The self should be reinstated; for the valid objections that hold against the soul do not hold against the self. But the soul must go as a concept in psychology.

Two further general standpoints of psychology have been dis- cussed. Chase (6) defends the doctrine of inheritance of modifica- tions of behavior. “Glandular responses such as those given in strongly emotional situations become easily comprehensible if they are viewed as conditioned reflexes which, once set up in ancestral organisms, were transmitted.” This view is supported by the experi- ments of Kammerer and the ‘hormone theory’ of Cunningham. Moreover, it accounts for the fact that many sorts of ancestral expe- rience arenotinherited. ‘Thesame author (7) argues that students of social problems should base their theories upon the laws of human behavior rather than upon the laws of biology and economics.

REFERENCES 1. Bone, B. H. The Nature of the Psychical. J. of Phil., Psychol., &$c., 1917, 14, 288-294. . Catxins, M. W. Purposing Self versus Potent Soul: A Discussion of Professor Warren’s “Study of Purpose.” J. of Phil., Psychol., €c., 1917, 14, 197-200. 3. Catxins, M. W. A Clue to Holt’s Treatment of the Freudian Wish. J. of Phil., Psychol., €Sc., 1917, 14, 441-442. . Catxins, M.W. The Case of Self against Soul. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 278-300. . Carr, H. The Nature of Mental Process. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 181-187. . Cuase,H.W. On the Inheritance of Acquired Modifications of Behavior. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 28, 175-190. . Coase, H. W. Psychology and Social Science. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 28, 216-228. 8. Conen, M. R. The Distinction between the Mental and the Physical. /. of Phil., Psychol., &Sc., 1917, 14, 261-267. g. Fire, W. Consciousness—Where Is It? J. of Phil., Psychol., €Sc., 1917, 14, 281-288. 10. Horrni£, R. F. A. The Mental and the Physical as a Problem for Philosophy. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 297-314. 11. Jevurre, §. E. Dr. Watson. and the Concept of Mental Disease. J. of Phil., Psychol., €Fc., 1917, 14, 267-275. 12. Pittspury, W. B. The New Developments in Psychology in the Past Quarter Century. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 56-60. 13. Pratt, J.B. A Defense of Dualistic Realism. /. of Phil., Psychol., c., 1917, 14, 253-261. 14. Ursan, W. M. The Knowledge of Other Minds and the Problem of Meaning and Value. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 274-296. 15. Wasuspurn, M. F. Some Thoughts on the Last Quarter Century in Psychology. Phil. Rev., 1917, 26, 46-55. 16. Watson, J. B., & Morcan, J. J. B. Emotional Reactions and Psychological Experimentation. Amer. J. of Psychol., 1917, 28, 163-174.




17. Watson, J.B. An Attempted Formulation of the Scope of Behavior Psychology. Psychol. Revo., 1917, 24, 329-352.

18. Watson, J. B. Does Holt Follow Freud? J. of Phil., Psychol., &c., 1917, 14, 85-92.

19. Weiss, A. P. Relation b Rev., 1917, 24, 301-317.

20. Weiss, A. P. Relation between Functional and Behavior Psychology. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 353-368.

21. Yerkes, R. M. Behaviorism and Genetic Psychology. J. of Phil., Psychol. $c., 1917, 14, 154-160.

etween Structural and Behavior Psychology. Psychol.



Ohio State University

The contributions, by professional psychologists in which the term consciousness and its derivatives are placed at the center of gravity are becoming fewer in number, and the references are of a supplementary character in which either a structural or analytic attitude is taken for granted: Those who regard consciousness from the functional standpoint, while maintaining the interaction between mental activity and bodily processes, do not emphasize this relation- ship, preferring rather to leave the mind-body problem subsidiary to the actual analysis and investigation of human conduct.

Titchener (10) gives an excellent genetic analysis of the Wundtian concepts of consciousness and attention and also answers the objec- tions raised by Britz (1) against the concept that sensory clearness is the elementary phenomenon in what is ordinarily called attention. A clear and concise exposition of the nature of cognitive and attri- butive clearness is incorporated in the discussion and gives the article its prime merit. Carr (2) suggests that more emphasis be given to the psychophysical and neural conditions in mental process. In teaching psychology much unnecessary confusion results because the exclusively subjective descriptions of traditional psychology are given independently of the neural basis. A complete description of mental phenomena should include both the psychical and physical aspects as a unified system. By a revision of the definitions in psy- chology so they will conform to the actual methods which already prevail wecan do much toward the elimination of the sharp distinc- tions which confuse rather than enlighten students.

The need for definitely formulating the relation between the con-

to 4. P. WEISS

scious and the subconscious when interpreting or requiring intro- spective reports is indicated in a discussion by Martin (4) who believes that our opinion of the value of some introspective data depends upon our view of the relation between the conscious and the subconscious, in fact, of the subconscious itself. What may be termed a border- line case between waking and dream consciousness is experimentally investigated by Yoakum and Hill (12) in the case of Miss Z., in which groups of twelve consonants that were to be memorized were repro- duced by free associations which formed the outline of a story. The peculiarity of these stories lies in their resemblance to dreams, having the same sort of symbolism, wish-fulfillment and expression of ‘re- pressed complexes.’ The conservatism in the use of the term consciousness character- tic of the professional psychologist is not shared by the psychoan- alysts who crowd man with a host of the spirits of departed and not always noteworthy ancestors to intrude themselves into all that is bad and the little good that is left. This school would do well to realize that to say a ‘subconscious process elaborates an idea to escape the censor’ is merely a fanciful way of indicating that the conscious- ness of a normal person is different than that of the abnormal. Neu- rologists have failed to find a ‘censor,’ the ‘libido,’ the psychic energy’ and the host of other entities that are introduced. It is simpler and far more scientific to merely state the facts. Such statements as ‘the unconscious succeeds in breaking through without the necessity for a direct attack upon the barriers of the censor, which are rather circumvented in a clever manner,’ belong to the realm of poetry or mythology; not to science.

The biological concept of recapitulation in the embryologica! development of the individual is applied to psychopathic conditions by Jelliffe (3) who believes that in a limited sense we may regard the psychic development of the individual as a recapitulation of the psychic evolution of mankind, which however is much obscured by the variable nature of verbal forms of expression. An interesting technique (psychogram) for recording the psychopathic conditions of a patient is also developed. Following along the lines laid down by Rousseau, Ring (8) defines psychoanalysis as a method for dis- covering in the mind forgotten experiences, the emotional tone of which is still active and is the determining cause of physical or mental conditions. Parsons (5) raises the question whether the gradual disappearance of the belief in evil spirits in modern culture may not be due to the general weakening of the instinct and emotion of fear.


Reminiscent of vitalism and faculty psychology is the article by Rank and Sachs (6) in which every affect, and the idea invested by it, has a natural tendency to appropriate as great a part of the mental life as possible as a consequence of affective forces. A comprehensive attempt is made to show the significance of the myth and legend for revealing the nature of some of those mental mechanisms which clamor for expression, but are never permitted to express themselves in their primary form. When the same sort of interpretation is extended to the social sciences (7) we find that a psychoanalytic examination of the fundamental concepts underlying the social sciences reveals a definite phylogenetic series from old mental atti- tudes which have been abandoned as unsuitable, to the modern con- ceptions which represent the most refined methods by which the originator was able to circumvent the censor.

Among the psychoanalysts who feel the need for restraint in the multiplication of entities are Solomon (g) who believes that the ana- lytic methodology and the dynamic view-point of mental mechanisms as developed by the Freudians has done much to bring system and order into mental science, but cautions against the tendency toward loose and unclear terminology, the overemphasis of psychical deter- minants and the exaggerated importance given to infantile and early childhood tendencies. Psychobioanalysis is suggested as a suitable name for the broader conception of psychoanalysis which is supple- mented by an analytic study along evolutionary and developmental lines, of the instincts, mental and moral qualities, tendencies and general makeup of man. In referring to the symbolic form in which consciousness often appears, White (11) concludes that what in con- sciousness would be regarded as anti-social and unconventional, may express itself in symbolic form and thus effectively disguise from the subject a consciousness that otherwise would be painful.

REFERENCES 1. Britz,C. A. Eine theor he und experimentelle Untersuchung tiber den psycho- logischen Begriff der Klarheit. Zurich, 1913. 2. Carr, H. The Nature of Mental Process. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 181-187.

3. Jeturre, S. E. Technique of Psychoanalysis, V. Psychoanal. Rev., 1917, 4, 70-83.

4. Martin, L. J. Introspection vs. the Subconscious. Psychol. Rev., 1917, 24, 242-243.

5. Parsons, E. C. Discomfiture and Evil Spirits. Psychoanal. Rev., 1916, 3, 288-294.

6. Rank, O., & Sacus, H. Payne, C. R., trans.) The Significance of Psycho- analysis for the Mental Sciences. Psychoanal. Rev., 1915, 2, 297-326, 428-457.


7. Rank, O., & Sacus, H. (Payne, C. R., trans.) The Significance of Psycho- analysis for the Mental Sciences (continued from Vol. 2). Psychoanal. Reo.,

1916, 3, 69-89, 189-214, 318-335.

8. Rinc, A. H. Psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Rev., 1915, 2, 390-408.

9. Sotomon, M. A Plea for a Broader Standpoint in Psychoanalysis. Psychoanal. Rev., 1915, 2, 52-72.

10. TircHENER, E. B. The Psychological Concept of Clearness. Psychol. Reo.,

1917, 24, 43-61.

11. Wurtz, W. A. Symbolism. Psychoanal. Rev., 1916, 3, 1-25.

12. Yoaxum, C. S., & Hitt, M. C. Persistent Complexes Derived Through Free Association. J. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1916, 11, 215-257.



University of Tennessee

The dream theories of Bergson, Freud and Maeder, previously reviewed, are still being discussed by several writers. Bergson’s belief that the dreamer possesses a relaxed consciousness is denied by Horton (10); and the more vigorous rdle ascribed to consciousness by Freudian theories, is upheld: irrelevancy in dreams is not due, as Bergson would have us believe, to lack of sufficient energy on the dreamer’s part to summon the correct image, but rather to the fact the dreamer is pre-stimulated and over-prepared in the direction of the irrelevant response. Marshall (13) agrees with Bergson that the nature of our dreams is clearly statable in that part of consciousness of which we are aware, and involves no subtile mystery such as Freud would weave about it; dismissing Freud with the remark that while the practical value of Freud’s work in relation to Hysteria and kin- dred problems may long be remembered “his theory of dreams will soon be laid aside as untenable and forgotten.”

Crenshaw (3) cites six dreams to substantiate his thesis that re- taliation or revenge-motive dreams are as important if not as frequent as sex-motive dreams. Horton (11) also criticizes Freud in that he fails to reveal the inner nature of dreams other than those with sex phantasy at work, and in that he fails to give the modus operandi of dreaming as a process of thinking. He contrasts the “reductive methods” of Freud and the “‘constructive methods” of Jung, with his own “reconstitutive method.” This method aims “to ‘recon- stitute’ the dream-thought . .. by tracing the wave of nervous excitation from its origin in primary stimulus-ideas . . . through a


specific apperception-mass into a consequently derived system of secondary images which form the manifest dream content.” For instance, such a stimulus-idea as might be caused by the actual scratching of a mouse in the sleeper’s room, constitutes a problem which the dreamer, by a process of trial and error, attempts to resolve and interpret; the dream is the result. This would agree with Mar- shall (13) : “In what we call our dreams we catch for the moment

certain mental items that were relatively emphatic in the psy- chic field during sleep, before the threshold was raised.”

Savage (16) believes that a study of dreams may assist in diag- nosis in many cases of mental disturbance; that erotic dreams may give rise to false charges of assault in neurotic persons; and that “happy dreams” in cases of chronic melancholia are indicative of a favorable prognosis. Jelliffe (12) scores the spirit of levity in one of Maeder’s critics and in general defends the right to be heard, of the Freudians, implying that many of their harshest opponents are but exhibiting a defense reaction—an ad hominem argument difficult of refutation (cf. 18).

Several writers bring us fresh material and new opinions on the dream problem. Y. Delage promises us a book on the subject and several chapters appear in various periodicals (¢. g., 4, 5,6). Perhaps the most stimulating of these original treatments are those of Horton (9) and of Gregory (8). Oneiric (7. ¢., “dream-”) conversion, says Horton, is produced by residuary facilitations in prepared neuro- grams (using Prince’s term); that is to say, an actual stimulus from the outside world, ¢. g., a door-slam, becomes in the dream a different stimulus-idea, ¢. g., a shot-fired, and engenders a rapid train of corol- lary ideas, such as ‘battle,’ ‘marching,’ and the like; because for some reason (explained by the previous experience, dream or real, of the sleeper), the “shot-fired” association finds neurograms already mobil- ized, and the irrelevant “door-slam” idea does not. Therefore the latter, though actually the prior stimulus, succeeds in crossing the threshold of awareness, if at all, only after the better facilitated “shot-fired” association has done so. There is therefore an apparent time inversion: the “shot-fired” dream appears to precede the “door- slam” consciousness, which latter may actually, however, arouse the sleeper.

Gregory (8) is also interested in the time-aspects of the dreaming state. He agrees with Seashore (17) that a dream may pass like a flash, and appear to last for hours, or days—a statement so often made that it is almost a platitude, yet one whose facts supporting, have


never, to the reviewer, appeared convincing. Gregory further ex- plains “the disturbance of the time-sense in dreaming” as due “to the expanding effect of a sudden or explosive rise of interest” on the part of the dreamer. He believes it an error to regard dreams pro- duced by a disturbance that awakes us, as occuring during sleep: “they occur explosively during the momentary period in which the mind springs from unconsciousness to its waking realization of the world.” As the mind breaks away from the unconsciousness of sleep and “‘springs forward in a sort of psychical explosion, some sensa- tions may obtrude themselves and a hurried context is supplied to them from memory”; and context and sensations fuse to produce the


Much more original work remains still to be done in investigation of the temporal aspects of dreams. Curiously enough material is, if anything, over-abundant. Anyone who has made a serious effort to study his own dreams will sympathize with Seashore who confesses he has “found it advisable to abandon the intensive study of dreams”’ in the interests of sleep. Perhaps it explains, too, the same author’s

there is perhaps no dreamless sleep”’!



REFERENCES 1. Burr, C. B. Two very definite wish-fulfilment dreams. Psychoanal. Reo., 1916, 3, 292-294.

2. CLAPAREDE, E. Sur la fonction du réve. Rev. phil., 1916, 81, 298-299.

3. CrensHaAw,H. Retaliationdreams. Psychoanal. Rev., 1916, 3, 391-393.

4. Detace, Y. La réve dans la littérature moderne. Rev. phil., 1916, 81, 219-274.

5. Detace, Y. Theorie du réve de Freud. Bull. instit. gen. psychol., 1915, 15, 117-135.

6. Detace, Y. Portée philosophique et valeur morale du réve. Rev. phil., 1916, Sz, 1-23.

7. GrimBERG, L. On somnambulism. Psychoanal. Rev., 1916, 3, 386-390.

8. Grecory, J. C. Dreams as psychical explosions. Mind, 1916, 25, 206-223.

9. Horton, L.H. The apparent inversion of timeindreams. /. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1916, 11, 48-59.

10. Horton, L. H. On the irrelevancy of dreams. J. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1916, 11, 143-171.

11. Horton, L. H. Scientific method in the interpretation of dreams. J. of Ab- norm. Psychol., 1915, 10, 369-399.

12. Jevurre, S. E. A rejoinder: Maeder’s dream problem, and its critic. J. of Abnorm. Psychol., 1916, 11, 335-343.

13. MarsHatt, H.R. Retentiveness and dreams. Mind, 1916, 26, 206-223.

14. Maeper, A. E. The dream problem. (Tr. by Hallock and Jelliffe.) N. Y.: Nerv. & Ment. Dis. Pub. Co., 1916. Pp. 43.

15. Saumon, A. D’un interesant phénoméne d’automatisme qu’on remarque apres les efforts musculaires chez les sujets sains. Rev. Neurol., 1916, 29, 27-34.


16. Savace, G.H. Some dreams, and their significance. J. of Ment. Sci., 1916, 58. 17. SEAsHORE, C. E. The frequency of dreams. Scient. Mo., 1916, 2, 467-474. 18. Watson, J.B. The psychology of wish-fulfilment. Scient. Mo., 1916, 3, 479-487.


BY HOWARD C. WARREN Princeton Uuiversity


Dunlap (1) sought the opinion of 125 American psychologists, selected for seniority in years of service, in regard to the use of the terms experience, consciousness, content of consciousness, thought, sensation, sense datum, and certain cognates. The results, according to the author, reflect the confusion which exists at present concerning the fundamental concepts of psychology, but indicates a favorable outlook for improvement. “The term experience seems hopeless of standardization.” Consciousness has lost some of its earlier meanings; there appears a tendency to limit it to awareness or cognition. He finds also a tendency “to use the terms thought and sensation for forms of awareness” (53). Sense datum is favored as denoting the object of awareness. [his investigation led to the appointment of a committee on terminology by the American Psychological Associa- tion, whose report is forthcoming.)

Pillsbury (4) defends the use of the term behavior to describe the object of psychology in the broadest sense. He insists that our fundamental definition should be “the servant of our science, not its master.” It should state the aims of the science in the briefest form possible, and in terms that shall be best understood by the indi- viduals for whom it is intended, that shall be least open to misunder- standing” (372). In contrast with the more subjective terms, behavior includes processes of our active life—habit, instinct, learning, etc.—which have little or no relation to consciousness. His plea is for an enlargement of the connotation of the term behavior, rather than a limitation of the field of the science.

Tawney (5) on the other hand considers behavior too broad and ambiguous a term to use in characterizing the subject-matter of psychology, since it may denote such varied activities as “the action of oxygen or the motion of a comet” (29). Even intelligent behavior is too vague, for “in what sense can the behavior of lower organisms be said to display intelligence?” (29). “The fundamental fact of


mental life is the fact of value, the tendency of psychic organisms first to select and then keep within their control whatever is necessary to their life” (31). For this type of behavior he proposes the term aesimation. ‘The discussion illustrates the chasm between volun- taristic and comparative psychology.

Two contributions from neighboring fields may be noted. Fuller (2) in proposing a revision of nomenclature protests against the use of proper names in brain and cord anatomy (¢. g., Rolando, Gowers, Goll, Clarke) on psychological grounds. Such names involve ab- stract memory; they bear no reference to the location or functions of parts, and are needlessly difficult to learn and retain. (The names of diseases—Pott’s, Bright’s, etc.—present similar difficulties.) Psy- chology is comparatively free from this evil, but a few instances, such as Purkinje phenomenon and organ of Corti, will come to mind.

Osborn (3) following Gregory distinguishes between heritage and habitus, the former denoting the totality of inherited or palaeotelic”’ characters, the latter the totality of recent adaptive or “caenotelic”’ characters. (We should not confuse the habitus with habits, 1. ¢., individually acquired characters.)


1. Duntap, K. The Results of a Questionary on Psychological Terminology. Johns Hopkins Unio. Circular, No. 285, 1916 (No. 5), pp. 55.

2. Futter, W. The Necessity of Revising the Nomenclature of the Anatomy of the Brain. J. of Amer. Med. Ass., 1916, 67, 328-330.

3. Osporn, H. F. Heritage and Habitus. Science, 1917, 45, 660-661.

4. Pittspury, W. B. The American Association for the Advancement of Science:— The Function and Test of Definition and Method in Psychology. Science,

1915, 41, 371-389. 5. Tawney,G.A. What is Behavior? J. of Phil., Psychol., c., 1915, 12, 29-32.



Harvard University

The only new text-book of general psychology this year is that of Breese (11). It is a book of the conventional type, clearly written and systematic. The author does not attempt to give new theories nor to make any important changes in the traditional psychological doctrines. ‘There are, however, two distinctive features. Different views are presented upon controversial points, and the reader is thus